This paper is the first systematic attempt to map the evolution of legal regulations concerning campaign finance in post-communist Romania and to link them with corruption practices parties have been engaged in, over the last decade. Our document analysis reveals a general increase in the complexity of the legal framework regulating campaign spending with a positive impact on reducing corruption. Still, many flaws remain which have been intensely exploited by the political parties. Using empirical data, we make an attempt to illustrate the different ways in which the Romanian parties have developed tools to indirectly obtain (and use) state resources for their own electoral purposes. These practices include: partisan tailored transfers of money from the government to own constituencies prior to elections; relying on large-scale patronage to reward party sponsors and activists; as well as making state agencies contribute indirectly to campaign funds under the guise of innocent workshops
Introduction
Following the regime change of 1989, post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) faced the crucial challenge of constructing and maintaining strong and stable political institutions. As representative democracies are unthinkable without political parties (Bryce 1921, 119; Schattschneider 1942 , 1), one major concern was to ensure the (re)establishment of multi-party systems in which independent and competitive actors had the opportunity to run in free and fair elections. Such an attitude was fueled by two main factors: the lack of representation for half a century and the preeminence of political parties as the first post-communist institutional actors.
Regarding the latter, political parties fulfilled relevant functions in the process of power transfer (e.g. the Round Table Talks ) and initial design choices (Kitschelt 1992 and Dellenbrant 1994). In new multi-party CEE systems three types of political competitors can be identified: continuous (i.e. successors or satellites of the former communist parties), revived (i.e. historical parties with interrupted existence during communism), and newly emerged (Kopecky 2001) . Among these categories, only the first enjoyed and, subsequently benefited from structural and human resources before the first post-communist elections. Consequently, a solution was necessary to foster the development of revived and newly emerged parties that represented the opposition parties and counterbalanced the political space. In this respect, public funding appeared to be the most likely type of support as it provided a number of advantages for the competing political actors (i.e. organizational costs, subventions for electoral campaign etc.). Moreover, greater resources allowed parties to develop complex organizations, recruit more and higher-quality candidates, strengthen ties with the electorate, and mobilize voters (Mendilow 1992; Lewis 1998; Grzymala-Busse 2002; Booth and Robbins 2010, 633) . At the same time, public funding was aimed at increasing the transparency of the political system (van Biezen and Kopecky 2007, 239 ; van Biezen 2008, 35) , party system stability (Roper 2002, 179) and the accountability of the competitors (Smilov 2007 , 1).
The two major downsides of public funding became visible, however, as soon as it became widespread. On the one hand, although it is aimed at reducing inequalities between parties and at increasing competition, public funding may have the opposite effect. The accumulation of state money by political parties competing in elections was thought to create a gap between existing actors and newcomers, thus discouraging the entries of new parties in the system (Birnir 2005, 918) . In this sense, the different allocation of state funding between parliamentary parties according to the votes received or between these and extra-parliamentary parties would create additional barriers for small actors. However, the existing research has found little evidence in favor of the claim that public subsidies have an impact on party competition (Scarrow 2006 ).
On the other hand, irrespective of its extent, public funding is not sufficient to cover party expenses as it is always accompanied by restrictive finance guidelines. At a theoretical level, this observation derives from the tripartite funding scheme proposed by von Beyme (1985) , who lists the most common sources of revenues for political parties: public funding, private contributions, and membership fees. The importance of the latter in the CEE countries is heavily reduced as previous research emphasized low levels of membership in post-communist countries. Even after party membership decline in Western European countries (Katz and Mair 1994; Mair and van Biezen 2001; Poguntke et al., 2009) , their rates are still considerably higher than those of CEE political parties (Lewis 1996; Bielasiak 1997; Kopecký 2001 , van Biezen 2003 , Spirova 2007 . In this respect, political parties lack relevant internal funding with the revenues from their members being reduced (Lewis 1998; van Biezen 2000; Gherghina 2009 ). For example, figures from the mid-1990s reveal that, with the exception of communists' successors, the political parties in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland could rely on members for less than 10% of their revenues (Lewis 1998, 138-139; Lewis 2008, 184) . At the same time, party officials of the political alliance governing Romania between 1996 and 2000 -the Democratic Convention -declared in 1996 that membership fees were never systematically collected although such fees were explicitly mentioned in the statute (Birnir 2005, 920) .
Consequently, private donations are the sole available tools to fill in the budgetary gaps of CEE political parties. As the private contributions also follow finance regulations, restrictive guidelines require political parties' strong efforts to collect sufficient money for their survival. In this respect, the very existence of political actors is conditioned by their capacity to attract funds. The practical alternative is the elusion of the laws, thus evading all prohibitions and limitations. The post-communist region provides quite a few illustrative examples of corruption scandals with private donations.
In 1997, a corruption scandal broke out in the Czech Republic following the discovery of a Swiss account belonging to the governing Civic Democratic Party (ODS) in which companies that did not want to be identified as donors made their contributions. As a result, the coalition partners of the ODS left the government and the executive led by Vaclav Klaus fell (Ondrej and Petr 2007, 85-86) . In Slovakia, using the names of ordinary people on the donors' list, although they had never contributed to campaign finance, was a practice deployed by the main governing party at the time, the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union Coalition (SDKU) (Slovak Spectator 2004) . In Poland, an official investigation revealed large donations fictitious in the case of the AWS candidate, Marian Krzaklewski, in the 2000 presidential elections. Among other factors, the negative publicity it received seems to have contributed to 'the gradual collapse of the party' (Walecki 2007, 117) .
Summing up, with isolated exceptions (e.g. Latvia), the post-communist political parties share the common feature of relying on state subventions for their funding (Ikstens et al. 2002; van Biezen 2003; Lewis 2008) . The intensity of state support differs: in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, and Slovenia parties are highly subsidized by the state (Smilov and Toplak 2007) , whereas in Romania it amounts to considerably less 2 . This constitutes an interesting paradox, which will be the main empirical puzzle addressed in this paper. In this context, and bearing in mind that the Romanian legislation about private funding is also quite prohibitive, the main question to be In this context, our paper constitutes the first systematic attempt to map the evolution of legal regulations concerning campaign financing in Romania and link them with corruption practices parties have been engaged in. We have to emphasize from the onset that despite party finance regulations having attained some of their goals, the Romanian case is not a success story. In spite of stricter regulations that diminished some of the problems, political parties found ways to avoid the formal provisions and get access to funds. Although a single-case study, this analysis bears relevant implications for broader transitional contexts in which illicit party funding is involved, while the judiciary is too politicized to penalize it.
The first section analyzes the legal framework in which party campaigns have taken place in the twenty years since the fall of communism. Then we specifically point to faults in the regulations that have allowed for or even triggered corrupt practices. The third section presents and explains the main patterns of campaign spending in the last three general electoral cycles (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) . Next, our empirical section analyzes several party finance scandals illustrative of the ways in which Romanian parties have developed tools to indirectly obtain (and use) state resources for electoral purposes. The conclusion synthesizes our findings and points to further fruitful directions of research.
The Evolution of Party Funding Regulations in Romania
Political funding regulations aim at ensuring sufficient resources for political competitors (either institutional or individual) in order to fulfill the functions of representation. State funding of parties may be either direct (i.e. subventions, direct public funding) or indirect (i.e. access to state media, tax relief), or both. Previous studies (Ikstens et al. 2002; Nassmacher 2003; Smilov 2007) indicate that political parties in all the CEE countries have access to free airtime and most of them receive inhand subsidies. With some exceptions (e.g. Latvia, Moldova, Ukraine) public funding is widespread in European political systems, whereas tax relief appears to be the least popular type of state support (apparent only in Hungary and Slovenia). Direct funding may be either party or campaign based. In particular, while the former refers to organizational costs of (parliamentary) parties between elections, the latter targets specific costs for the electoral campaign, available to all the competitors on a different basis (Birnir 2005, 926; Roper 2007, 98) . The line separating the two budgetary categories is rather thin as the money received for general expenses and specific campaign finance is used for the same final goal of electoral success (Pinto-Duschinsky 2002) . Consequently, in this study we do not differentiate between these two categories, treating public funding as a monolithic source.
Party financing in Romania gradually evolved from very general provisions valid for the first post-communist elections from 1990 to very specific regulations applicable in the 2008 parliamentary elections. Table 1 summarizes the evolution of legal regulations concerning the parties' and individual politicians' campaign expenditures for the entire post-communist period. Our primary aim is not explaining why governing parties have engaged in public finance reforms (for a comprehensive theoretical framework on the matter see : Scarrow 2004 ), but to assess the overall efficiency of the latter in preventing and reducing corruption practices.
For the first three elections -1990, 1992 , and 1996 -the issues related to party funding were included in broader general laws. For example, the decree issued in March access to public radio and television (Article 51). Furthermore, it stipulates that all competing political parties and formations will receive state subventions, whereas donations from foreign sources are not permitted (Article 53). The decree was issued by the Provisional Council for National Union (CPUN) -the caretaker government until the first elections -and had the character of a law as no legislature was in place. The provisions of the decree had a strong component of electoral strategy, obviously accounting for context specific factors. Thus, free access to media did not provide equal opportunities, but favored the National Salvation Front (FSN) whose president and candidate in the 1990 elections was also the leader of CPUN. FSN featured prominently in every broadcast (Carothers 1992; Linz and Stepan 1996, 361) as there were solely public media assets and the CPUN was identified with the state. State subventions were also a strategic tool for the FSN, the successor of the former Romanian Communist Party, which controlled the financial resources of its predecessor and thus had substantial funding without using this provision. Public funds were introduced by the FSN to encourage the proliferation of parties with two goals. On the one hand, the electorate was confronted with an afflux of new parties to which FSN was the stable alternative competitor (Roper 2007, 102) . On the other hand, the creation of new parties divided opposition voters, thus no political party apart from FSN was to have a strong representation in the new legislature. Apart from allocating some financial resources to the opposition parties with this decree (Carothers 1992) , the FSN reached both goals as it gained more than two thirds of the popular vote in the legislative elections, while its candidate was elected as president of the country with more than 85% of the votes. Furthermore, the prohibitions towards private funding were not aimed at limiting the propensity of corruption, but rather at forbidding the leader of one opposition party (the National Peasants Party Christian Democratic-PNTCD) to use in the electoral campaign his personal fortune amassed during his exile in Great Britain (Roper 2007, 101) .
For the 1992 elections, party funding was again included in the general law referring to the legislative elections for the two Chambers of Parliament (Law 68/1992).
The provisions regarding access to media and the public or private funding suffered modifications compared to the previous decree as a different goal had to be reached. The On the other hand, all competitors received public funds on the basis of a complementary law to be provided by Parliament, but all those that failed to receive more than 5% of the votes at national level had to return the money within two months of the elections (article 45, par. 1). Private donations were allowed without a ceiling as long as they were publicly declared, but foreign aid was banned (article 45, par. 3).
Similarly, accepting money from public institutions and authorities was forbidden. Two problems were clearly visible with respect to these provisions: (1) the legal lack of necessary control mechanisms -state institutions were supposed to implement these provisions, but no specific instructions regarding the control and enforcement were stipulated; and (2) none of the competitors in those elections received public funding as the complementary law was never adopted.
The 1996 elections brought new regulations, and specific attention was paid to party finance and electoral campaigns (Law 27/1996) . According to article 33 (par. 1), the funding sources of a political party were membership fees, donations and contributions, revenues from its own activities, and the state budget according to the annual budget law. As membership fees were considered to be tax-free, the total paid by an individual per year should be less than 50 times the minimum salary (article 34, par.
3). The yearly donations could not exceed 0.005% of the state budget revenues, whereas this percentage increased to 0.01% in electoral years. An individual donation could not be more than 100 times the minimum salary, whereas an institutional donation should be less than 500 times the minimum salary. All private contributions had to be reported, but the donor could remain anonymous when the amount did not exceed 10 times the minimum salary. A party could receive anonymous donations up to 20% of the state subvention in a year (article 35). Donations from public institutions, companies where the state holds the majority of shares, from foreign states or organizations were completely forbidden. However, the political party could receive funding from international political organizations which it was affiliated to or from foreign parties it collaborated with on political grounds (article 36).
State support for parties included extra-parliamentary political formations, but severely discriminated against them. A four-step procedure of money distribution dominated by the parliamentary parties was then established (article 39). The amount designated for political parties could not be more than 0.04% of the state budget. The first phase included the equal distribution of one third of the total amount to parliamentary parties as a base subvention. In the second phase, the remaining two thirds of the amount was divided among the same parliamentary parties proportionally to the number of their seats, up to a maximum of five base subventions. The third phase took the leftovers from the second phase and distributed them equally to all the parties getting at least 2% of the votes in the previous elections. The share of money for individual parties could not be higher than a base subvention. The final phase implied the proportional (i.e. mandates) distribution of the leftovers from the third phase to all the parliamentary parties. One major observation to be made with respect to the content of such law is that parliamentary parties tended to receive considerable amounts of public money, whereas extra-parliamentary parties received almost nothing. As a result, it comes as no surprise that since 1992 no new political party has gained mandates in Parliament.
The numerous problems of the 1996 law, occurring mostly in the 2000 elections (see the following sections), determined the creation of a special law on the funding of political parties (Law 43/2003) . 3 The basic provisions regarding the sources of income for political parties stayed the same as in the previous law, but some of the revenue thresholds were modified. Thus, private donations could now total up to 0.025% of the state budget and 0.05% in electoral years, while individuals could make donations of up to 200 times the minimum salary, with companies being able to do so up to 500 times the minimum salary. As in the previous law, confidential donations could not be larger than 10 times the minimum salary, instead they should add up to no more than 15% of state funding in a year (Article 5). State support for political parties remained unchanged with just one exception. In the third phase, the 2% vote share for the extra- Four general remarks are directly observable at the end of this brief overview.
First, the provisions regarding party finance have clearly become more specific with time. Whereas, at the beginning, legislators were preoccupied with ensuring the framework for funding, the most recent versions of the law focus on details regarding expenditure caps and control mechanisms. Second, strictly related to the previous point, the lawmaker's caution also increased mainly due to the fact that numerous problems occurred when? (as illustrated in the following section). Third, the amounts of money provided to political parties significantly increased from one law to another. 
The Direct Effect of Control Mechanisms: Diminishing Corruption?
The central argument of this section is that the problematic provisions of the laws regulating party funding in Romania have brought along the emergence of corruption scandals. Our analysis focuses on the 1996, 2003, and 2006 laws, as they represented the framework in which the elections in the last decade were organized. The general overview in the previous section helps when trying to identify the modifications undertaken over time with respect to major categories in party financing laws. However, the elusion of the law resides in the total lack of control mechanisms. Using document analysis, we address this topic further, referring to a few practical consequences. By 'corruption practices' we refer generically to all three types of particularistic exchanges:
clientelism, corruption and patronage (Kopecký and Scherlis, 2008) . As we will have the opportunity to observe in this section, as well as in the next, all of them have been alternatively employed by Romanian parties to illegally gather campaign resources and/or to reward their benefactors.
The 1996 law had three major shortcomings, mostly related to the private donations, which were carefully exploited by political competitors. First, the provision of goods and services was not included among the contributions. The solution to calculate the value of goods and services at market value and to declare it as part of private donations occurred as late as the 2003 law. Second, there were no control mechanisms with respect to the expenses of political parties, and public institutions were unable to trace the destination of money. The 2003 law filled this gap by demanding political parties to present full reports of the revenues and expenditures and by enforcing a rigorous control of campaign materials. The absence of these first two components from the 1996 law generated a few corruption scandals. One of the biggest scandals involved the 1996 campaign of the former president Ion Iliescu: 5.79 million dollars was illegally spent on campaign materials through a contract for the creation of a luxury album presenting Romania. Such a situation was also possible due to the fact that control mechanisms were loose. The only requirement for political parties was to publish the list of their private donors by the end of the following March. 6 Thus, all the financial revenues in an electoral year were reported long after the elections. At the same time, no punishment was included for the oversight of the law.
What were the consequences of these shortcomings? Tables 2 and 3 The figures reflect that the discrepancies are similarly high for both the incumbent (PNL, PNTCD, and PD) and major opposition parties (PDSR -the successor of FDSN).
Interestingly enough, however, a party size "effect" can be observed here: as it follows from the table below, small parties were closer to the real figures, but this was mainly due to the fact they could not attract a lot of private donations.
To partially overcome such shortcomings, the 2003 law installed control mechanisms. In this respect, it demanded political parties to declare their revenues and expenditures to the Court of Accounts within 15 days of having the final election results.
The validation of elected candidates was conditioned by such financial reports (Article 25). At the same time, this law included a series of measures that the Court of Accounts could take whenever irregularities were noticed (Article 27). In a similar vein, the introduction of expenditures caps was supposed to diminish the incidence of money that could not be justified. The direct effect is seen in table 3, were a diminishing discrepancy between the declared and real expenditures in the 2004 elections is clearly observed.
One major exception to it is the governing party at the time (i.e. the PSD), which declared much less than observed as a result of the monitoring process. This is not surprising if we take into account that the party very effectively colonized state resources in those years and developed clientelistic networks run by the so-called, 'local barons', presidents of the county councils. Moreover, the big difference appears mainly because the APD also evaluated the discounts made by the newspapers to the party in exchange for publicity bought by state agencies (Gallagher 2005) . (Pîrvulescu et al. 2005) Unfortunately, less information is available for 2004 than for the previous (2000) elections (we lack data for the spending made by the UDMR and the PNŢCD). Still, it is important to note here that three of the parties participating in the 2000 elections were the subject of a merger through absorption into larger competitors: APR and UFD were swollen by the PNL, while the tiny PSDR united with the giant PDSR to form PSD (Social Democratic Party). There was even further simplification and polarization of the political scene, as PNL and PD formed the Justice and Truth Alliance (DA) in order to mobilize the right wing electorate against the PSD. The latter party ruled Romania is reflected also in the exponential increase of the money spent by the three main parties: the PSD and, especially, the PDL and the PNL in the campaign for the general elections held in that year (table 4) . Due mainly to the significant increase of control and the strict regulation of the spending caps, achieved through this law, at the 2008 local elections the amounts of money declared by the parties have for the first time coincided to a large extent to the APD monitoring (APD 2008) . This is why the organization did not monitor anymore the campaign spending at the general elections held that same autumn.
An important pattern regarding the campaign spending of the Romanian parties can be identified with respect to their incumbency or opposition status. Unsurprisingly, parties that governed either alone or in coalition governments, tend to have more money at their disposal and accordingly to spend more than their counterparts in the opposition. Figure 1 shows that this was the case with both the PNL and the PDL (who governed in the extended CDR coalition between 1996 and 2000 and again after the Unlike them, PSD represents the exception -with constantly high spending irrespective of whether the party governed or not. There is a rather unambiguous explanation for this. On the one hand, PSD enjoys the largest number of members (Gherghina 2009 ) and consequently can rely more on their contributions. On the other hand, the party has had for the whole post-communist period the leading number of locally elected representatives (mayors, county councils presidents etc) and has developed wellfunctioning clientelistic networks (Gallagher 2005) . This was possible mainly because PSD is the direct successor of the Romanian Communist Party, from which it inherited a gigantic organizational structure, including many of its activists. The first relevant contribution that this paper makes to the scholarship on party finance consists in illustrating how a general increase in the complexity of the legal framework regulating campaign spending in Romania had a positive impact on reducing corruption. We did so through document analysis of the main party funding laws and then by comparing the officially declared campaign costs and those that the largest civic NGO in Romania estimates as the real ones by. At empirical level, we have emphasized the main corruption practices developed by the Romanian parties to indirectly obtain (and use) state resources for their own electoral purposes. The list presented is by no means exhaustive, but it certainly captures the most widely-used methods of directing public money into campaign coffers. These practices were successful despite the more and more complex legal framework that attempted to prevent them.
One limitation of the study resides in the fact that we have relied on a single source of data -which might imply a reliability problem if the APD coders had biases in certain directions. Although there are no reasons to believe that this was the case, alternative data are desirable. We have tried to compensate for this shortcoming by the use of qualitative assessments -based on media reports -and declarations of party officials.
Further directions of study can consider the impact of institutional changes on corruption practices. Apart from the legal framework under scrutiny in this paper, there are numerous changes that may influence the intensity of directing public money to 
